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Abstract
To make a difference in policy making about socio-ecological systems, ecologists must grasp when decision makers are amenable to acting on ecological
expertise and when they are not. To enable them to do so we present a matrix
for classifying a socio-ecological system by the extent of what we don’t know
about its natural components and the social interactions that affects them.
We use four examples, Midcontinent Mallards, Laysan Ducks, Pallid Sturgeon,
and Rocky Mountain Grey Wolves to illustrate how the combination of natural and social source of indeterminism matters. Where social indeterminism
is high, ecologists can expand the range of possible science-based options decision makers might consider even while recognizing societal-based concerns
rather than science will dominate decision making. In contrast, where natural indeterminism is low, ecologists can offer reasonably accurate predictions
that may well serve as inputs into decision making. Depending on the combination of natural and social indeterminism characterizing a particular circumstance, ecologists have different roles to play in informing socio-ecological
system management.

Introduction
Writing in 1932, Pulitzer Prize winning political commentator, Walter Lippman (1932, p. 149) recognized that
“the will of the people” was “a highly variable and incalculable factor . . . at the point where knowledge is to
be applied to action.” For example, the U.S. Congress,
pressured by hunters, ranchers, and farmers, removed
the Rocky Mountain Grey Wolf from the endangered
species list in the states of Montana, Idaho, and parts
of Washington and Oregon. Although there have been
instances where the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has
removed species from the list, May 2011 was the first
time a U.S. Congressional Act eliminated a species from
the endangered species list. What conservationists see are
U.S. Congressional deliberations reflecting not the science but the political nature of the wolf controversy.
As public policy, environmental policy decisions must

consider what interested parties know, value and prefer because ultimately public policy is about impacts on
what society values highly (National Research Council
2008).
In the policy realm, a good decision is defined as being
logically consistent with what is known, including uncertainties, what management alternatives can be undertaken, and what the decision makers want for themselves
or their constituencies (Howard 1966, 1968; Raiffa 1968).
Ecologists can contribute to the first two components
through technical analysis of socio-ecological systems
(SES)—peer into the future, explain how systems work,
identify which components are especially important, outline the consequences of alternative decisions and construct scenarios of possible preferred futures. ShraderFrechette & McCoy (1993) argue bottom up approaches
to ecological explanation informed by knowledge of specific taxa and focusing on specific decisions, make a more
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helpful contribution to environmental problem solving
than demonstrations of general ecological theory.
The third component of a good decision, being logically
consistent with what the decision makers want for themselves or their constituencies, is often beyond the scope
of ecology. To be able to apply science to resolving environmental ills requires recognizing the worth of the political arena for judging what underpins environmental
debates—the value basis of disputes (Sarewitz 2004). This
is particularly difficult for ecologists because ecology as a
science is goal directed, and those goals are inherently
normative because they involve specifying what constitutes “natural” or “healthy” (Shrader-Frechette & McCoy
1993).
Once we acknowledge values matter, the next step
is to concede there are players in situations, such as
managing the Rocky Mountain Grey Wolf, for whom
no amount of information, no matter how persuasively
presented, will sway their views. We know from psychological research into human decision making that
especially when people are faced with uncertainty their
thinking diverges markedly from what is assumed in
normative decision theory (Tversky & Kahneman 1972;
Kahneman et al. 1982). The ubiquity of strongly held
views, substantial deviations from the assumptions in
normative decision theory and the unpredictable nature
of interactions among all players in SES mean the future
cannot be known with certainty. What results is “socially
generated indeterminism,” a subset of indeterminism or
“all forms of not knowing” (Tyre & Michaels 2011).
We argue ecologists need to put socially generated indeterminism on their radar screens if they are to be able
to distinguish when the science they have to offer may
or may not influence decision making. “Socially generated indeterminism” is not reducible by applying science.
For any given task, analytical and heuristic processes
may contribute independently to judgments (Stanovich &
West 2000; Ferreira et al. 2006). In the following section,
we consider key attributes of indeterminism. We then
present a matrix based on the combination of natural and
social indeterminism present in SES. Using this matrix we
identify the different opportunities for how ecologists can
contribute to decision making depending on the combination of indeterminism present, including where providing more science is most likely to contribute to decision
making. We conclude ecologists can contribute to environmental decision making, once they accept that how
they do so, and what can be achieved, depends on the
political setting. As difficult as processing uncertain information is, addressing trade-offs and concerns over values is as challenging, if not more so (National Research
Council 2008).

290

Indeterminism and its attributes
Rather than sorting through the many and varied definitions of uncertainty (e.g., Regan et al. 2002; Walker
et al. 2003; Ascough et al. 2008; Mearns 2010 among
others), we begin by returning to a concept about which
there is little doubt—certainty. If one is certain about
the future, this implies a particular outcome will happen.
This condition of certainty is analogous to an older
concept in philosophy, determinism, which holds that if
the current state of reality is known, so too are all future
states of reality (Popper 1982). A determinist worldview
implies present, past, and future are tied together as
frames in a film. In contrast, indeterminism holds there
is no certain future, even if the current state of nature
is known exactly. There remains a deep philosophical
divide between those who subscribe to a deterministic
worldview and those who subscribe to an indeterministic
one. The compromise position is the world is assumed
deterministic, but our epistemic knowledge of reality is
insufficient to ever be able to make perfect predictions.
For our purposes, the consequences of this “weak indeterminism” and Popper’s strong indeterminism are
identical—we must make decisions in the absence of
perfect information.
Tyre & Michaels (2011) divided indeterminism in SES
into two dimensions: natural and social. Natural indeterminism is the form of indeterminism familiar to ecologists arising from, for example, changes in the environment, demographic stochasticity, and not knowing
which of two or more hypotheses is more correct. Social indeterminism arises from at least three attributes
associated with human activity: random process, shortsightedness and intentionality (Pielke 2007). Lee (1993)
referred to this source of indeterminism as “management
turbulence”; this is an attractive image because although
the onset of turbulence in a fluid is relatively predictable,
the outcomes are not. The following three attributes are
features of natural indeterminism in the extreme and all
forms of social indeterminism.

The future is not like the past
Although it is widely recognized that the dynamics of an
SES often contain a random component, the analysis of
an SES typically assumes that such stochastic variation
is not changing over time—it is drawn from a stationary
distribution. This assumption is so deeply embedded in
how ecologists approach science that it can be difficult to
recognize. It is relied upon implicitly every time ecologists use data from the past to make predictions about the
future—something that we are being increasingly called
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upon to do (Carpenter 2002). As we accumulate longer
time series, particularly on the climate system, it is increasingly clear that this assumption is untenable (e.g.,
Milly et al. 2008). The natural systems on which humans
rely are not stationary, and never have been.

There are no limits
Every time ecologists fit a statistical model to data in an
effort to understand variability, they implicitly assume
the variability is bounded—there are upper limits to how
much change ecologists can expect to see. This limit arises
because the probability distributions decrease exponentially toward zero as the random variable gets farther
from the central tendency. However, given both natural
and social systems potentially adapt in an evolutionary
manner to changed circumstances, bounding future dynamics in this way can grossly underestimate the potential magnitude of changes and perturbations. The presence of alternative stable states in SES (Scheffer 2009)
also contributes to this problem; new dynamics, unlike
those seen previously, may emerge after a critical threshold has been crossed.

Uncertainty will never be eliminated completely
Ecologists often feel strongly that one important reason
for doing good science is to reduce uncertainty about the
system being managed (e.g., Beven 2002). Even if we can
reduce some sources of natural indeterminism via careful study, there will always remain a resistant nugget of
unknowability about the future. For example, the size of
the Pallid Sturgeon population on the Missouri River next
year has some degree of variability, even beyond our imperfect ability to measure it. Demographic stochasticity in
the nature of births and deaths coupled with variation in
weather that affects growth and survival means that we
can only ever predict a distribution of future population
sizes. Similarly, it may be possible to reduce social indeterminism by changing the nature of the social system
itself, but this would not be a direct result of scientific enquiry. No amount of studying the social component will
reduce the potential for indeterminism in the system’s future dynamics.
We have learned a lot from cognitive psychology about
how people respond to indeterminism. Mostly from experimental research, we know trust and procedural fairness matter in decision making when uncertainty is perceived (Van den Bos 2001). At the same time individuals
become acutely concerned with ascertaining how credible information sources are (Van den Bos 2001), more
willing to question the reliability and adequacy of risk estimates, less inclined to be reassured (Rich et al. 1995),

Figure 1 Characterizing socio-ecological systems in terms of the extent
of their natural and social indeterminism.

more likely to be steadfast in what they believe and what
policies they prefer, and to terminate prematurely their
quest for facts (Janis & Mann 1977; Klein 1996; Covello
et al. 2001). We have learned how people make decisions
in the absence of perfect information from social science
studies on risk. From the vantage point of the social sciences, risk involves an array of wanted and unwanted
effects people attribute to a particular cause, resulting
in consequences for something about which they care
(Kasperson & Pijawka 1985), such as SES. We do know
from Kahneman & Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory people are risk averse when focusing on losses and risk prone
when paying attention to gains. Rather than maximizing
their benefits, many people balance their risk-taking behavior to avoid a major disaster and to achieve an acceptable payoff (Tversky 1972; Simon 1976).
Research is progressing on understanding how to promote human behavioral change impacting the environment. Particularly promising are frameworks linking values, norms, and behavior (Stern 2000). How decision
makers respond to indeterminism in SESs shapes their
uptake of ecologists’ technical analysis in SES related decisions (Jaeger et al. 2001). Consequently, what an ecologist can contribute depends on relative levels of natural
and social indeterminism and how they are perceived.

A typology of indeterminism
To aid ecologists in determining the different ways in
which their science can make a difference in decision
making, we developed a matrix in which a given SES
can be characterized in terms of the degree of its natural and social indeterminism (Figure 1). The natural indeterminism axis starts at the bottom with indeterminism that can be described by probability distributions (i.e.,
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it is bounded), even if irreducible, and nonstationarity
is either well understood, or short time frames make it
less relevant. At the high end, natural indeterminism is
not bounded by probability distributions and has substantial nonstationarity. On the left side of the social indeterminism axis, value conflicts are absent or muted. As one
moves rightward on this axis the magnitude of social indeterminism increases, values diverge and with that risk
tolerance deviates. Next, we provide examples to illustrate how the matrix can be used to characterize SES and
to suggest how ecologists might profitably contribute to
decision making within each of the four quadrants created by the two axes. How ecologists will be able to contribute to decision making about an SES is in large part
a function of the constraints imposed by the combination
of natural and social indeterminism associated with that
SES and how other actors, notably decision makers respond to the combination.
The Adaptive Harvest Management (AHM) Program
for Midcontinent Mallards (Anas platyrhynchos) in North
America (Nichols et al. 2007) is in the lower left quadrant because it is characterized by relatively low levels of
natural and social indeterminism. The legal authority to
establish hunting regulations for North American waterfowl dates back to the 1918 Migratory Bird Treaty Act. Although winter surveys and banding data were employed
to some extent between 1930 and 1950, the use of regularly collected scientific data in making harvest regulation
decisions matured in the 1950s, when United States’ and
Canadian agencies began to survey systematically breeding populations of waterfowl on a continental scale. Since
1995, the first hunting season of AHM, the selection of
regulatory “packages” has been based on sophisticated
analysis of population data using optimal control theory,
and careful accounting of many sources of natural indeterminism, including annual variation in the number of
ponds available for breeding, and epistemic uncertainty
about the structure of population dynamics. Although
there are still many aspects of the natural system that are
irreducibly variable, many key components of the system
are characterized by well-bounded probability distributions. The social dynamics of the system have low levels
of indeterminism because of a high degree of shared values amongst members of society who care greatly about
waterfowl—mostly sportspeople who want to hunt and
preserve the resource. The current form of resource governance has been in place for over half a century, and
is accepted widely by participants. In addition, the legal mandate provided by the Migratory Bird Treaty Act
places management responsibility with the federal U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service. These factors combine to produce a system of resource governance that is highly resistant to challenge! The potential for unbounded variation
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in social indeterminism is hinted at, however, by James
D. Nichols, one of the architects of the optimal control
approach. Although he has “not encountered much talk
about AHM placing the resource at risk,” he contends,
“the real test of the plan will come when the models and
optimization lead to the recommendation to restrict regulations for the first time—will that be accepted by stakeholders?” (Nichols, personal communication, 2011)
In the example of The AHM of Midcontinent Mallards
and other cases displaying low social and natural indeterminism, ecologists may be able to contribute (relatively)
accurate predictions and system explanations with reasonable expectation that these will have a high likelihood
of contributing constructively to the debate.
A system with low values of social indeterminism, but
high levels of natural indeterminism, is managing the
Laysan Duck (Anas laysanensis). In the first decade of the
21st century, the population on the 4.1 sq km Laysan
Island fluctuated between 300 and 600 birds (Reynolds
et al. 2008). Although the ducks were restricted to a single population on a remote atoll in the 20th century,
there is evidence that the ducks had existed on other
Hawaiian Archipelago islands. Perhaps because of the introduction of invasive species like rats, these other populations were extirpated. In addition to the usual concerns about a species with a single small population with
limited translocation success, there is a substantial degree of unbounded, nonstationary natural indeterminism
caused by not knowing the magnitude or rate of future
sea level rise—the highest point on Laysan Island is 12 m
above current sea level (Reynolds et al. 2008). In contrast,
the degree of social indeterminism is negligible—there
are no extant human settlements, and the birds live in the
largest marine reserve in the world. Consequently managing risks for these birds can be done without having to
make tradeoffs involving human activities, such as land
development, that at times derail conservation.
The responses of species at risk, such as Laysan Ducks,
to climate change (Conroy et al. 2011) is a good example of nonstationarity with lurking critical thresholds. Although there may be low social indeterminism, the high
natural indeterminism means that we cannot (yet) place
objective probability distributions on future climate, nor
do we know now how most species will respond to shifts
in climate. Nonetheless we can still imagine ecologists will
be able to generate a range of possible scenarios, each predicting the distribution of population sizes conditional on
some degree of sea level rise. These scenarios could provide the scientific basis for developing policies that will
protect the ducks under a wide range of alternative futures.
In the matrix’s top right quadrant are systems with
high levels of natural and social indeterminism. The
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recovery of the Pallid Sturgeon (Scaphirhynchus albus)
in the Missouri River basin in the upper Midwest of
the United States exemplifies such a system. When this
species was listed as endangered in the mid-1980s, the
primary threats were thought to be the loss of shallow water habitats and high spring flows resulting from
regulating the Missouri River discharge by dams, and
channelizing the lower portions of the river for navigation (USFWS 2003). Although natural reproduction is
very low, after three decades of increasingly intensive research, it is still not known what exactly must be changed
about the current river system to enable this species to
thrive. Although there are multiple hypotheses, testing
these hypotheses requires either extensively modifying
the river channel, restoring high spring flows, or both.
Neither is popular with people living in the basin or working on the river, because of increased flood risk, loss
of river navigability, or sacrificing hydropower potential.
Because some segment of human society cares passionately about each of these considerations, efforts to restore sturgeon habitat generate significant levels of social
indeterminism.
As social indeterminism increases, the likelihood people agree to be bound by decisions decreases. The frequent legal challenges to the governance of the Missouri
River in the late 1990s and early 2000s are a symptom of
high social indeterminism. In the case of the population
dynamics of Pallid Sturgeon this is coupled with high natural indeterminism. In particular, ecologists do not know
what must be changed about the Missouri River ecosystem to allow successful natural recruitment. In addition,
it will take decades for any biological response to habitat
restoration to be detected; alterations to the hydrograph
may show quicker responses under some hypotheses, but
these are the very manipulations with the greatest value
distinctions among the many stakeholders on the river.
In the presence of indeterminism, we can expect stakeholders to be very critical of risk assessments for Pallid Sturgeon, and be unwilling to change their opinions
about what matters and what actions should be taken.
When working with decision makers to develop scenarios of long-term biological response to habitat restoration
on the Missouri River, ecologists can use these insights to
temper their expectations about the immediate impact of
their work. Instead they could focus on building credibility for risk assessments by validating predictions against
independent data.
In the bottom right quadrant we find systems with
low levels of natural indeterminism and high levels of
social indeterminism. An example of this is managing
the Rocky Mountain population of Grey Wolves. Ecologists know a lot about wolves; their behavior, phys-

iology, evolutionary ecology, and population dynamics
have been the subject of interest for over a century. The
restored Rocky Mountains’ population is monitored intensively (Smith & Ferguson 2005); the movements and
reproduction of individual packs are tracked by a small
army of biologists. Although there are scientific debates,
for example about the extent to which wolf packs are affected by hunting over and above any immediate mortality impacts (Creel & Rotella 2010), these are at a much
finer level of detail than those facing managers of Pallid
Sturgeon and Laysan Ducks. The high volatility of social
indeterminism is in evidence through the routine challenging in court of U.S. Fish and Wildlife service decisions
and the recent groundbreaking Congressional decision
to remove the Gray wolf from the endangered species
list. As ecologists have learned in such circumstances science does not drive policy, even if natural indeterminism
is low.
Where social indeterminism is high, regardless of the
state of natural indeterminism, ecologists should be prepared to have their reasoning dismissed by some advocates and seized upon by others who see its potential
to support their positions (Sarewitz 2000; Pielke 2007).
Nonetheless they should strive to make predictions about
future outcomes, and to test those predictions against
real data. Such a process of alerting society to emerging and evolving challenges is time consuming, but by
verifying the prediction skill of ecological models those
predictions will be more acceptable once the social situation changes to enable their direct use. Another role
for the ecologist in the face of high social indeterminism
is to expand the range of possible outcomes for decision
makers to consider, thus enabling the possibility for robust, science-grounded decisions to be generated. In addition, some ecologists may choose to engage in the messy,
democratic, political process where those with competing values and interests debate their perspectives in an
attempt to achieve an operational consensus that will result in action (Sarewitz 2000). This may involve participating in the search for where consensus may be feasible,
such as in component, linked, or smaller issues. Alternatively, ecologists may choose to “. . . openly associate
science with possible courses of action – that is, to serve
as Honest Brokers of Policy Alternatives.” (Pielke 2007,
p. 7). If political consensus is achieved, ecologists can
monitor implemented policies and assess their performance. Where consensus does not result, ecologists still
have an essential role to play. The need to advocate for
full consideration of natural indeterminism does not diminish. As Rachel Carson demonstrated, there is value in
educating those other than the primary players about a
concern (Bocking 2004).
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Conclusion
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